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In a recent examination of the origins of ordinal utility theory in neoclassical economics, Robert D. Cooter and Peter Rappoport argue that
the ordinalist revolution of the 1930s, after which most economists abandoned interpersonal utility comparisons as normative and unscientific,
constituted neither unambiguous progress in economic science nor the
abandonment of normative theorizing, as many economists and historians of economic thought have generally believed (Cooter and Rappoport, 1984). Rather, the widespread acceptance of ordinalism, with
its focus on Pareto optimality, simply represented the emergence of a
new neoclassical research agenda that, on the one hand, defined economics differently than had the material welfare theorists of the cardinal
utility school and, on the other, adopted a positivist methodology in
contrast to the less restrictive empiricism of the cardinalists.
In a later exchange with I. M. D. Little, Cooter and Rappoport support their view that nothing more than a shift in research agendas was
involved in the ordinalist revolution by arguing that every conceptual
framework operates persuasively in the particular way in which it "singles out objects for analysis, and designates how empirical information
about them is to be sought, organized and understood" (Cooter and
Rappoport, 1985, p. 1190). After the 1930s, most economists were simply
persuaded that the new ordinalist research program did indeed single
out valuable objects of analysis and strategies for their research. Moreover, they add, "once the normative nature of propositions is underThe author is indebted to the editors, Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson,
and two anonymous referees of this journal for constructive comments on previous versions of this article .
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stood in terms of that body of doctrine from which they emanated, it
then becomes apparent that material welfare economics is no more nOr
no less normative than ordinalist economics" (ibid.), and, consequently,
that the change in research agendas did not abandon normative theorizing. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the scientific integrity of cardinal utility theory is not jeopardized by the cardinalists' willingness to
make interpersonal utility comparisons, and the advent of ordinalism
does not represent unambiguous scientific progress in the development
of a value-free economics. The analytical revolution in neoclassical economic theory in the 1930s might better be said to represent the emergence of a less self-consciously normative manner of theorizing, although
normative it remains in virtue of the persuasive way in which its new
perspective operates.
In genera!, this characterization of the ordinalist revolution as a
change in research agendas has much to recommend it. At the same
time, however, to claim, as do Cooter and Rappoport, that because all
theory is persuasive in its selective choice'()f objects of investigation and
methods of analysis, all theory is thereby normative in nature, is to make
all theory trivially and uninformatively normative . More seriously, to
claim that a theory's perspective signals its normative content is to confuse normative propositions per se with simply value-laden ones. Yet,
not only are the two types of propositions recognizably distinct, but the
frequent ambiguities in a theory's value-laden propositions often permit
a variety of competing inferences regarding that theory's normative content.1
Contrary to Cooter and Rappoport, then, a theory's perspective per
se does not say much about its normative content. Thus, to say that the
ordinalist revolution involved basic changes in theoretical perspective
does little to explain how cardinalism and ordinal ism lead to different
normative commitments or how the ordinalist revolution involved a
change in normative understanding. This is a disappointing conclusion
to draw about an account that makes the transition from cardinalism to
ordinalism largely a matter of changes in normative thinking, especially
when there already exists a well-established literature concerning precisely those changes in normative thinking in neoclassical economics
1. Normative propositions per se make claims about what is right or wrong, just, fair,
good for people, and so on. Value-laden propositions, or value-judgments, merely
express controversial assumptions or ostensibly subjective points of view . Thus, in
ordinalist theory, for example, the claim that agents' wants are nonsatiable expresses
a value-laden proposition or value-judgment, while the proposition that individuals
are better off in situation x than in situation y if and only if they prefer x to y expresses
a normative proposition per se. The role the former pays in any particular inference
regarding the latter depends on its interpretation, additional assumptions, among others, such that failure to distinguish the two types of propositions obscures the normative - in the most general sense - structure of the theory in question.
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thatemerged with the ordinalist focus on Pareto optimality judgments.2
How is it, then, that Cooter and Rappoport come to be so misguided
about the normative in the development of neoclassical economic theory?
I argue that Cooter and Rappoport and their opponents share a
prevalent misconception of the normative. This emerges in the exchange
between Cooter-Rappoport and Little, in which Cooter-Rappoport and
Little, although disagreeing over the character of the ordinalist revolution, nonetheless make common use of key elements in the emotive
theory of ethics. In the emotive theory, especially as popularized by A.
J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, normative propositions and simply
value-laden ones (or value judgments) are treated interchangeably as
subjective expressions of attitude used persuasively to affect opinion and
belief in a non cognitive manner. Such propositions are contrasted with
positive ones that lay claim to scientific objectivity by virtue of their
susceptibility to empirical confirmation.
This is of some importance in the contemporary analysis of economics methodology, because to the extent that economists treat norlI1ative propositions as noncognitive, good economic theory then
becomes synonymous with positive economic theory. Yet if, as suggested later, philosophers are right in dismissing the emotive theory as
fundamentally mistaken, then many normative propositions may be no
less objective than many positive ones. On this view, the elements of
good economic theory need neither be necessarily positive nor necessarily empirically confirmable. Rejecting the emotive theory, economists
would be able to appreciate the different roles normative propositions
play in particular economic theories, rather than simply regard them as
noncognitive expressions of attitude .
The exchange between Cooter-Rappoport and Little is a particularly
convenient opportunity for raising these points, because of Little's own
explicit association with the emotive theory of ethics. Indeed, in resisting
the Cooter-Rappoport view that the persuasive way in which a perspective operates is central to the understanding of the normative nature
of a theory, Little (1985, p. 1187) recalls his own account of the normative
content of a theory. In his A Critique of Welfare Economics, he drew directly
on the work of the most influential emotivist philosopher of the later
1930s and 1940s, Charles L. Stevenson. In Little's account, value-laden
propositions are identified as value judgments by their use of attitudeinfluencing emotive language.
2. Of course, the conservative nature of Pareto recommendations, as a sort of "secondbest" utilitarianism, has long been appreciated since such judgments rule out tradeoffs in individual well-being via interpersonal utility comparisons that would increase
overall social utility. But Pareto recommendations are also normatively controversial in
being consequentialist, paternalist, and rights-ignoring. For a recent survey of some of
these issues, see the introduction to Sen and Williams (1982) . Of Sen's own many works
in this area, see especially Sen (1979).
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Value judgments can, then, be recognized by considering what
judgments are likely to influence people, not because they describe
in colourless unemotive language facts which people already approve of, but because they describe facts in an emotive way, or
because they are merely emotive and describe nothing at all. (Little,
1957, p. 70)
Furthermore, Little adds, following an influential article of Stevenson's
(1938), to define, "whether implicitly or expliCitly, an emotive word in
such a way that one can or does apply it to something one wants persuasively described" is to give that work a "persuasive definition" (p.
69). Whether a proposition is value-laden is simply a matter of whether
it employs emotive language.
Cooter and Rappoport respond, quite reasonably, that "the emotive
force or persuasive nature of economic arguments" cannot be located
"at the level of individual words or phrases, since these only have their
sense within a particular conceptual framEiwork" (1985, p. 1190). In their
view, the "recommendatory terminology for expressing conclusions
would seem . . . to be a secondary matter," since "the persuasive element of a body of doctrine" is associated with the perspective or framework in which ideas and data are presented (ibid.). Yet, it is doubtful
that this critique amounts to more than a difference in emphasis. Little
could allow that persuasive definitions gather their force because they
presuppose the perspective of a particular theory . On the other hand,
Cooter-Rappoport and Little agree that the perspective associated with
a body of theory has persuasive impact, and that it is this persuasiveness
that constitutes a theory's normative content.
Despite the fact that the emotive theory originally developed as more
or less an adjunct to logical positivist views of science (Ayer, 1952, p.
20), few seem to appreciate that a critical posture toward the logical
positivist ideal of science as preeminently positive and objective also
entails reevaluation of one's views about normative thinking. Indeed,
for many adherents of the logical positivist dichotomy between the positive /objective and the normative / nonobjective, abandoning the logical
positivist conception of science as an exclusively objective endeavor led
not to abandoning the view of the normative as noncognitive and nonobjective but to a view of all theory as nonobjective and ultimately
normative . Ironically, then, although elaboration of the emotive theory
was originally of secondary concern to the logical positivists, among
many economists its assumptions have both outlasted and displaced
those underlying the positivists' view of science.
How this came to be, it is fair to say, is probably tied up with the
very strong terms in which Ayer and others originally characterized the
normative in their effort to distinguish and elevate scientific thinking.
Because the logical positivists believed first and foremost that experience
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was the test and control of objectivity in science, normative propositions,
which were clearly neither descriptive of experience nor testable, were
said to express feelings rather than make assertions. In Ayer's words:
We can see why it is impossible to find a criterion for determining
the validity of ethical judgments. It is not because they have an
"absolute" validity which is mysteriously independent of ordinary
sense-experience, but because they have no objective validity whatsoever. If a sentence makes no statement at all, there is obviously
no sense in asking whether what it says is true or false. And we
have seen that sentences which simply express moral judgments
do not say anything. They are pure expressions of feeling and as
such do not come under the category of truth or falsehood . They
are unverifiable for the same reason as a cry of pain or a word of
command is unverifiable - because they do not express genuine
propositions. (Ayer, 1952, pp. 108-9)
Since moral judgments are untestable, they cannot be regarded as objective. Accordingly, although the logical positivists' idea of an objective,
positive science may be regarded illusory, normative thinking is still
thought not to be part of any serious theoretical endeavor.
It might be argued, then, that the ordinalist revolution reflected not
only a change in research agendas, but also a more or less conscious
response to the emotivist view that moral dispute is a contest of influence
in which individuals seek to persuade one another by expressing their
feelings and attitudes. Ayer asserted that in moral argument one informs
one's opponent of those facts that seem relevant to the issue at hand,
but that if disagreement persists, then it must be concluded that "our
opponent happens to have undergone a different process of moral 'conditioning' from ourselves" and "we abandon the attempt to convince
him by argument" (Ayer, 1952, p. 110). Lionel Robbins, in his influential
critique of interpersonal utility comparisons as normative, emphasized
a similar theme in arguing that should an individual argue that some
people are capable of experiencing more satisfaction from given incomes
than others - a value judgment in his view - "we could not show he
was wrong in any objective sense, any more than we could show that
we were right" (Robbins, 1935, p . 140).
Thus, with these views commanding increasing attention in the
1930s and 1940s, welfare theorists such as Nicholas Kaldor (1939) and
J. R. Hicks (1941) were faced with a dilemma . Although policy recommendation was a natural concomitant to economic analysis, that normative judgment in the popular view was deemed irremediably
noncognitive seemed to preclude any place for policy in a discipline that
aspired to become an objective science. In effect, the analytical and
normative components of neoclassical theory seemed in conflict at the
methodological level. Their response was to seize one of the horns of
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the dilemma by elaborating nonnormative, presumably objective compensation criteria for proposed policy changes. Compensation criteria
merely require that those gaining from proposed policy changes only
be able to compensate losers from such changes without the need to
measure individuals' respective utilities in the process. Their successful
elaboration would thus enable economists to make policy recommendations without making interpersonal utility comparisons, which Robbins had insisted could never be free of moral controversy. Hicks, a key
proponent of this strategy, suggested its rationale in terms directly responsive to Ayer's view that moral controversy was irresolvable: "If A
is made so much better off by the change that he could compensate B
for his loss, and still have something left over, then the reorganization
is an unequivocal improvement" (Hicks, 1941, p. 111, emphasis added).
Economics could thus retain its policy dimension because although welfare recommendations are indeed normative, nonetheless they appear
sufficiently innocuous on this view that it might even be said that it is
the objective, positive component of neodtl.ssical analysis that ends up
driving all recommendation .
Compensation criteria, however, were ultimately abandoned by
most welfare theorists as flawed and unworkable, 3 thus leaving Pareto
optimality judgments as essentially the sole policy instrument in neoclassical economics, and the methodological conflict between objective
economic analysis and nonobjective normative judgment unresolved.
Thus, in a later reaction to Robbins' arguments, Paul Samuelson retreats
to something of a cultural relativist position to accommodate the unavoidable prospect of moral controversy. Asserting that Robbins is "undoubtedly correct" in his determination to exclude "ethical value
judgments" from economic science, Samuelson instead calls for examination of the consequences of different such judgments, given the satisfaction of the usual Pareto conditions (Samuelson, 1947, pp. 219-21).
That is, in allowing different moral judgments to enter welfare analysis
much like data, although one cannot hope to reconcile different opinions
regarding well-being, one can incorporate such value judgments in concrete policy recommendations that, given those assumptions, will not
arouse controversy.
In this way, Samuelson, and the many other modern welfare theorists who follow him in this, not only adopts the new research agenda
of neoclassical economics, as the account of Cooter and Rappoport has
it, but also, it seems more importantly, appears to do so in good part
because of a conviction that the normative is fundamentally nonobjective. It seems fair to argue, thus, that what ultimately underlies the
ordinalist revolution in neoclassical theory is not so much a change in
3. See Mishan (1960) for a history of these developments. Compensation criteria, however,
do continue to playa role in cost-benefit analysis .
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perspective on neoclassical theory as an acceptance of the logical positivist emotive theory view that normative thinking is nonobjective and
noncognitive. The change in perspective in the ordinalist revolution,
then, was less a matter of the way in which the new conceptual framework "singles out objects for analysis, and designates how empirical
information about them is to be sought, organized and understood,"
and more a matter of a specific response to questions concerning the
place of normative thinking in economic theory.
The emotive theory suffered decisive criticism in the immediate decade after its appearance, so that by the early 1950s, it was largely discredited among professional philosophers. 4 The critics reasoned that
although moral or ethical judgments are often used in a persuasive
manner, and although they often express the attitudes and emotions of
those who utter them, moral disagreement is still fundamentally it matter
of rational argument about objective differences between right and
wrong, the character of different moral goods, and so forth. Moral discourse, furthermore, presupposes a distinction between the expression
of sentiments peculiar to particular individuals and the expression of
sentiments approved by individuals generally. That is, moral judgments
are typically made with the expectation that they will withstand some
degree of rational scrutiny. They thus often possess an objectivity not
unlike that conventionally associated with many positive propositions.
Indeed, it has been argued that moral judgments are subject to at least
two truth criteria, namely, ethical consistency and that such judgment
involve something more than temporary attitude and commitment
(Brandt, 1950, pp. 315-16).
These developments in philosophy cannot be said to have had much
impact on economists, who continue to look on the normative much as
Samuelson did. Cooter and Rappoport, then, might be said to have failed
to explain the ordinalist revolution in a double sense . On the one hand,
they uncritically adopt the emotivist view of the normative as a matter
of persuasiveness. On the other hand, they also overlook an important
dimension of the ordinalist revolution, the new view of normative thinking as nonobjective. This latter failing is not surprising, since that Cooter
and Rappoport's commitment to the ordinalist view of normative thinking blinds them to the very different views of the normative held by the
cardinalists, as well as to the disappearance of these more objective views
in the research agendas of the ordinalists.
Finally, it should also be added that Cooter and Rappoport's methodology of change in res'e arch agendas is itself colored by their attach·
ment to the ordinalist view of the normative as nonobjective. Although
they recognize that the normative claims the cardinalists make are
different from those of the ordinalists - Pareto optimality judgments
4. See Warnock (1960) for a history of these developments.
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supplant interpersonal utility comparisons in conventional policy
recommendation - nonetheless, because they conceive of the normative
as nonobjective, they cannot see in this change the abandonment of an
objectivist conception for a subjectivist one. Thus, because Cooter and
Rappoport see the change in neoclassical research agendas to be very
much a normative matter, the change in research agendas must itself
also be subjective or noncognitive. In this latter respect, they follow a
view already widespread among philosophers of science. Yet, perhaps,
their particular focus on the ordinalist revolution adds, almost by accident, an insight heretofore missing in philosophers' accounts of changes
in research agendas in the natural sciences: the considerable appeal of
the idea of a noncognitive change in research agendas to methodologists
in economics ultimately itself derives from entrenched convictions about
objectivity and subjectivity that themselves derive from the view of the
normative that emerged from the ordinalist revolution.
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